Hearing Date: No hearing scheduled Courtroom Number: No hearing scheduled Location: No hearing scheduled

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS COUNTY DEPARTMENT, CHANCERY DIVISION

FILED 9/19/2019 5:14 PM DOROTHY BROWN CIRCUIT CLERK COOK COUNTY, IL 2018CH08965

WILLIAM CALLOWAY,)		2018CH08965
)		6645307
Plaintiff,)		
)	18 CH 08965	
V.)		
)	Hon. Raymond Mitchell	
CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT,)		
)		
Defendant)		

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RULE TO SHOW CAUSE WHY CPD AND COPA SHOULD NOT BE HELD IN CONTEMPT OF COURT AND TO ENFORCE THE COURT'S AUGUST 16, 2018 ORDER

This is a FOIA case seeking the release of "all dash cam, body cam, surveillance cam footage collect[ed] as part of the investigation into the officer involve[d] shooting that occurred Saturday July 14th, on 71st & Chappell in the South Shore neighborhood." Compl. Ex. A. That incident was the fatal shooting of Harith Augustus by a CPD officer. *See* Chicago Tribune, 'We are hurting deeply': Family of Harith Augustus responds to fatal police shooting, *available at* https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-met-statement-family-harith-augustus-20180721-story.html. Shortly after the shooting, CPD released an edited copy of some of the video in response to public criticism of the shooting, but refused to produce the remaining, unedited video under FOIA, resulting in this lawsuit. *See* COPA Ltr. to CPD, attached as Exhibit A (referencing the "piecemeal and arguably narrative-driven video release" by CPD).

On August 16, 2018, following a hearing before Judge Flynn on Plaintiff's summary judgment motion, in which CPD represented that the Civilian Office of Police Accountability "does intend to release this material today," the Court ordered that "Civilian Office of Police Accountability shall produce all of the requested records at issue in this case by 5pm on August

16, 2018." 8/16/18 Trans. at 8:11-9:10, attached as Ex. B; 8/16/18 Order, attached as Ex. C. COPA posted videos on its website by that deadline, and CPD represented to the Court on September 7, 2018, that it complied with the order, which required the production of "all" dash cam, body cam, and surveillance video of the incident. 9/7/18 Trans. at 7:1-4, attached as Exhibit D.

On September 19, 2019, The Intercept and journalist Jamie Kalven reported on a CPD dash cam video of the incident that had not previously been released. The Intercept, How Chicago Police Created a False Narrative After Officers Killed Harith Augustus, *available at* https://theintercept.com/2019/09/19/harith-augustus-shooting-chicago-police/ ("Intercept Article"). That video, as it turns out, was posted to the COPA website for the first time on August 30, 2019, more than a year after the court-ordered deadline. A CPD report uncovered by Mr. Kalven and dated July 14, 2018, more than a month *before* the court-ordered production deadline, clearly referenced dash cam video and the fact that it had been "uploaded to City servers." Ex. E.

In addition, Mr. Kalven discovered reference in CPD reports to two additional videos from nearby closed-circuit private surveillance cameras that were downloaded by CPD but have still not been released. *See* Intercept Article, Embedded Video, at 5:30. CPD and COPA remain in continued violation of the August 16, 2018 order through their failure to produce this surveillance video, now weeks after the dash cam video was finally made public.

For these reasons, the Court should (1) order CPD and COPA to show cause why they should not be held in contempt, and (2) order CPD to produce the surveillance videos that have still not been released within 24 hours.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

Matthew V. Topic

Attorneys for Plaintiff WILLIAM CALLOWAY

Matthew Topic Joshua Burday LOEVY & LOEVY 311 North Aberdeen, 3rd Floor Chicago, IL 60607 312-243-5900 foia@loevy.com Atty. No. 41295

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Matthew V. Topic, certify that on September 19, 2019, I caused the foregoing to be served via electronic mail on all counsel of record.

/s/ Matthew V. Topic



Via Electronic Mail

July 19, 2018

Eddie T. Johnson Superintendent of Police Chicago Police Department 3510 S. Michigan Avenue Chicago, Illinois 60653

Dear Superintendent Johnson:

I write regarding the Chicago Police Department's release of certain video footage related to the July 14, 2018 officer-involved death of Mr. Harith Augustus.

We are concerned that the Department's release of select — and edited — video from the incident undermines the process for release of information carefully established by the City. Straying from these established policies can frustrate efforts to restore trust and confidence in this City's accountability system. The Department's decision to release certain video, but not other video or audio from this incident has placed COPA in the untenable position of attempting to maintain the integrity of our investigation after the Department has already released some — but not all — of the relevant video. This piecemeal and arguably narrative-driven video release breeds suspicions, which may ultimately undermine COPA's ability to successfully investigate allegations of misconduct and officer involved shootings — an outcome inconsistent with the City's efforts at reform.

Furthermore, and of critical importance, publicly releasing video prior to COPA conducting key interviews creates the substantial risk that witnesses to an incident, civilian or sworn, may intentionally or unintentionally comport their recollection of the events with what they have seen in the video. Additionally, such unilateral public release does not allow COPA, as it is required to do under the City's Video Release Policy, the opportunity to afford the deceased's next of kin review of the video prior to its release.

As a former law enforcement officer, I understand the need for public safety and the Department's concerns and obligations in that regard; however, there are other methods of ensuring public safety that the Department could have – and has previously – used that do not risk undermining a subsequent investigation. The Department electing to release video in an effort to quell public concern in this instance has the real potential to undermine the accountability process by establishing a dangerous precedent in which video is released only when it serves to justify the actions of Department members. That would be a step backward, not forward, for Chicago's transparency efforts. Public safety must be maintained even in

1615 WEST CHICAGO AVENUE, 5TH FLOOR, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60622 312.743.COPA (COMPLAINT LINE) | 312.746.3609 (MAIN LINE) | 312.745.3598 (TTY) | WWW.CHICAGOCOPA.ORG instances in which there is no video appearing to provide justification for the Department member's actions or, worse, when there is video that appears to undermine a Department member's actions. To the extent the Department's decision addressed a real or perceived risk of public safety, any short-term success in that regard comes with an increased risk to public safety in the future should the Department make a different decision in the immediate aftermath of another incident. In short, any narrative-driven decision relating to release of information may undercut COPA's ability to balance transparency with investigative needs, and may also undercut the long-term goal of public trust.

The City and its citizens will only come to trust the Department as well as the entire oversight system when there is trust in the *system* and the *process*. COPA therefore requests that the Department cease any further release of information in this case or other COPA investigations without the express concurrence of COPA.

Respectfully,

Sydney R. Roberts

Chief Administrator

Civilian Office of Police Accountability

cc: Walter Katz, Deputy Chief of Staff for Public Safety, Office of the Mayor

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, COOK COUNTY ILLINOIS

CHANCERY DIVISION

WILLIAM CALLOWAY,

Plaintiff,

vs.

No. 18 CH 08965

CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT,

Defendant.

)

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS at the hearing of the above-entitled cause before the Honorable JUDGE PETER FLYNN, Judge of said Court, in Courtroom 2408, Daley Center, Chicago, Illinois on Thursday, August 16, 2018 commencing at 10:15 A.M.

		2
1	APPEARANCES:	
2	LOEVY & LOEVY, by	
3	MR. MATT TOPIC	
4	MR. JOSH BURDAY	
5	(311 North Aderdeen, 3rd Floor	
6	Chicago, Illinois 60607)	
7	appeared on behalf of the plaintiff;	
8		
9		
10	CITY OF CHICAGO, by	
11	MS. AMBER RITTER	
12	(30 North LaSalle Street, Suite 1720	
13	Chicago, Illinois 60602)	
14	appeared on behalf of the defendant.	
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1	MS. RITTER: Amber Ritter for the
2	Police Department.
3	MR. TOPIC: And Matt Topic for
4	Mr. Calloway.
5	THE COURT: This matter is before the
6	Court on cross motions for summary judgment.
7	I have read all of the material
8	that you have given me, and hopefully I will
9	have it in front of me in the next 30 seconds
10	or so.
11	But I don't want to stop either
12	side from adding anything you feel you should
13	add.
14	So have you talked about who
15	would go first?
16	MS. RITTER: It is my initial motion,
17	so I could go first, I think that would be
18	appropriate.
19	MR. TOPIC: No objection.
20	MS. RITTER: Your Honor has indicated
21	that he, of course, has read the briefs. I
22	don't want to belabor what you have already

read. I do think that it is worth pointing out a few things.

And, particularly, first about the issue of the timing of when this complaint was filed, the actual allegations of the complaint itself and how they don't state a cause of action under FOIA.

Now to be clear, since the time that the complaint has been filed, the police have denied the FOIA request.

THE COURT: The argument that you just began with is a legitimate argument, but for purposes of our discussion this morning, it is a little bit the tail-wagging stall.

Were I to accept your argument 100%, I would dismiss this action without prejudice to its instant refiling.

MS. RITTER: Right.

THE COURT: At the end of which we would be exactly where we are now.

MS. RITTER: Agreed.

THE COURT: I really don't want to do

that if I --

MS. RITTER: I totally understand that, and that makes perfect sense from an efficiency standpoint.

But I do want to point out that I don't think -- I do think it is a flouting of the FOIA law for a plaintiff to file a FOIA request on -- over the weekend, and then file a lawsuit on a Wednesday morning before the public body even has even responded in any way.

The FOIA statute is clear that the Court only has jurisdiction upon a denial of a FOIA request. It must be either done in writing or after five business days have past if the public body fails to respond. Neither of this has happened here. I understand that it is a waste of time to get into that --

THE COURT: We have a much more substantive debate --

MS. RITTER: Just for the record I wanted to make it clear --

THE COURT: But I understand your

point.

MS. RITTER: Okay. Thank you.

And also just for the purposes of efficiency, it does seem that if we are, and again we will get to the substance of it in a moment, but you know if we are -- if summary judgment is entered on this complaint, seems like it needs to be amended in some fashion in order for summary judgment to be entered, either way on, you know, what actually is the reality of the situation at this point.

But having said that --

THE COURT: Okay. Let me just pause a second there.

I think what you are referring to is Gold Realty versus Kismet Cafe, which is a first district Appellate Court decision in which Justice Wolfson confronted a case in which as the Appellate Court panel told the story, on the facts before the Court the plaintiff was indeed entitled to summary judgment, but on a theory of relief that the

plaintiff hadn't explicitly pleaded in his complaint. Can't do that, wrote Justice Wolfson, and I therefore must conclude that I can't do that, even as he acknowledged that may seem hyper technical.

If you stop and think about what he was getting at, I don't know that it is hyper technical. It is certainly unforgiving but it is not necessarily hyper technical. It is however the rule in the first district.

So it would be difficult for me to grant a Motion for Summary Judgment by a plaintiff on the ground that the department had flunked the time requirements of FOIA, when the facts are that the department had in fact responded in an appropriately timely fashion, even though the plaintiff thinks that there are other serious deficiencies in the department's position.

Hopefully we can avoid that difficulty. It is a procedural problem, but all of you know that procedure is not a

triviality, if we don't pay attention to it we get in terrible trouble.

So, if we need to circle around and come back to that at the end, we will.

MS. RITTER: All right.

THE COURT: For the moment though let's move on to the more substantive issues on which the two of you have really head-on joined battle.

MS. RITTER: Thank you.

So on that issue, your Honor, first I would like to inform the Court that COPA, which is the entity that does make the, you know, regular release of video and other records pursuant to its video-release policy, which was of course pursuant to the Police Accountability Task Force recommendations several years ago, does intend to release this material today.

They are meeting, my understanding, one of the precursors to releasing anything is that they must show the

videos and the materials to the family of the decedent prior to releasing it, that is one of the requirements, and that is happening this afternoon.

So they weren't able to release anything prior to today's hearing, because they haven't been able to schedule something with the family. As long as the family actually comes in, they are planning to release this material towards the end of today.

So to the extent that is a factor in the Court's, you know, analysis or to just keep you abreast of what is actually happening in reality on one portion of that.

This case though, of course, is about whether CPD properly denied the FOIA request when they did so a week ago, you know, a week ago or a week and a half ago.

They did so, of course, on the grounds that there was an ongoing -- three different bases for the denial.

The first is, exemption

(7) (1) (d) (1) which provides that:

Records in the possession of any public body, created in the course administrative enforcement proceedings, and any law enforcement or correctional agency for law enforcement purposes are bound but only to the extent that disclosure would:

Section (1) is interfere with pending or actually and reasonably contemplated law enforcement proceedings conducted by any law enforcement or correctional agency that is the recipient of the request.

And while we are at it I will read: Section (2), which is also at issue, which is interfere with active administrative enforcement proceedings conducted by the public body that is the recipient of the request.

And finally Section (3) is, create a substantial likelihood that a person will be deprived of a fair trial or impartial hearing.

So plaintiff's argument here, if

I can characterize it, is that the law enforcement agency that is the recipient of the request, which they admit is in the statute, is the police department.

Whereas the law enforcement agency that is conducting the investigation and the administrative course of proceeding is COPA, Civilian Office of Police Accountability, COPA.

COPA is a separate City department, of course, from the police department. And as we all know --

THE COURT: Help me out here for the record, is the Chicago Police Department an independent entity capable of suing and being sued?

MS. RITTER: It is under FOIA, because a public body -- the definition of public body under FOIA is a, you know, public body or a subsection thereof.

And under the case law, each City department is a separate public body under

FOIA. So in that sense the police department is suable as is COPA.

THE COURT: So when we look at public bodies as in records in the possession of any public body under FOIA, we are not looking at public body in the sense of municipal corporation or independently suable entity, we are looking at an artificial construct that FOIA probably means the people who have the records.

MS. RITTER: I would agree that's probably what it means. You know, what it means here is up to debate.

Even if we take it to mean that the FOIA definition of body public, which does treat, you know, each City department as a separate public body, as being the public body that needs to get the FOIA request and also be the public body that needs to be conducting the investigation.

And I don't mean to jump ahead of you, if you wanted to focus on a different

point at this moment.

But the enabling statute of COPA is clear, that COPA's investigation must involve the police department, the assistance of the police department in conducting it.

That's part of the ordinance that created COPA, so that purpose COPA -- the police department is part of COPA's investigation of its own records. Its investigating its own employees.

Without the police department's cooperation COPA couldn't even get any records. They don't have access to records on their own.

THE COURT: What I was focusing on is 10 to 15 degrees off that point perhaps.

It is Mr. Topic's argument that for purposes of (7)(1)(d) of FOIA, COPA on the one hand, and the police department on the other hand, are just not the same entity.

How do you respond to that?

MS. RITTER: Its true. I agree with

22 that. They are not the same entity. There is

no getting around that.

COPA and the police department are two separate public bodies under the terms of the FOIA statute. We agree with that.

THE COURT: In that case, (7)(1)(d)(2) which says interfere with active administrative enforcement proceedings conducted by the public body that is the recipient of the request would not seem to fit here?

MS. RITTER: On it's face, that's true.

I agree with that. And that's the sort of

conundrum we are in here.

THE COURT: I'm not sure it makes practical sense, but the statute says what it says.

MS. RITTER: It doesn't make practical sense, and I agree the statute says what it says. And I understand that argument and that's why we are here.

I just have a few points to, sort of nuance points that I think are important to consider when we are talking about this.

The first is what I just mentioned that the COPA enabling statute -- or ordinance, which is codified at the Chicago Municipal Code 278140 says:

officer, employee, department and agency of the City to cooperate with the office, the office here being COPA, and any investigation undertaken pursuant to this chapter, any employee or appointed officer of the City who violates any provision of this chapter shall be subject to discipline including but not limited to discharge in addition to any other penalty provided in this chapter.

So COPA contemplates, COPA investigations contemplates that they necessarily rely on other City departments to get the records, for their assistance, et cetera.

In this case, COPA's Chief

Administrator Sidney Roberts has made it very

clear through her letters and her testimony --

letters to Superintendent Johnson, which was attached to the CPD's motion, and also her testimony at the police board, that in fact COPA's investigation, which is obviously a very important issue, very important public policy matter to allow their investigation to continue unhindered, would in fact be hindered by the release of further records in this case, specifically video.

THE COURT: I have to argue with your tense, as Mr. Topic would.

The problem is not that the investigation would in fact be hindered, but if we were to take Ms. Roberts literally, that the investigation already has been hindered, right?

MS. RITTER: She does make -- I do take issue with that, her statement I will read from it. Give me a moment to find the right section.

She says, and this is quoting from the letter that she wrote dated July 19, 2018 to Police Department Superintendent Eddy

Johnson, she said:

Publically releasing video -- and I understand this is the tense issue that you are talking about, there is a follow-up later in the letter that I think ties it into her request to not release further materials.

She says: Publicly releasing video prior to COPA conducting key interviews creates a substantial risk that witnesses to an incident, civilian or sworn, may intentionally or unintentionally comport the recollections of the events with what they have seen in the video.

Additionally, such unilateral public release does not allow COPA, as it is required to do under the City's video release policy, the opportunity to afford the deceased next of kin review of the video prior to the release.

And then she says, further down in the letter, COPA therefore requests that the department cease any further release of

information in this case or other COPA investigations without the express concurrence of COPA.

So she is -- I agree with you that a lot of her focus is sort of taking issue with CPD's decision to release the initial segment, small segment of the larger portion of video that exists, but she does tie it into, please stop, please don't release anything further.

THE COURT: Okay. I understand that.

I think the difficulty that I have with the way events in this case have unfolded, is that if we look at the precise situation that we are looking at here, and then we try to generalize from that a rule the effect of which is to say that the police department should stop when Ms. Roberts says they should stop.

This allows spin of an extreme nature in a way that it is a little difficult to square with purposes of FOIA.

If the police superintendent

releases, say you have a 10-minute video, the police superintendent releases 3 minutes of it, and then the other 7 are suppressed because COPA says, well, you shouldn't be interfering with our investigation, that's a little hard to justify, isn't it?

MS. RITTER: Only -- it is only hard to justify if there is additional information on that additional 7 minutes of video in your hypothetical that show for example other events, other witnesses that need, you know, to be interviewed, other things that they wish to --

THE COURT: I don't know that as I sit here. And the last thing in the world that would make any sense, would be for some Judge presiding over a FOIA case to be trying to make decisions of that sort about parts of a video.

MS. RITTER: Agreed. That's why the statements of Chief Administrator Roberts as verified by the affidavit of general -- acting General Counsel Brandon Crase of COPA, submit

that in fact, she is saying the release of the further stuff would in fact impede our investigation.

That is what she -- I agree with your Honor that you can't possibly make that decision, having not seen the video, but she has.

And she is saying, I need you to not release that because I'm saying that it would intentionally or unintentionally comport witnesses recollection of the events with what they have seen in the video.

She is saying that publically and also to Superintendent Johnson, and we have that submitted as an affidavit.

THE COURT: Is it not true though her

July 19th letter comes -- although its really

nicely written, if you are going to write a

very difficult letter in a short period of time

she does a good job of it, but the conclusion

she comes to is a possibility not a fact.

She says in short:

Any narrative driven decision relating to release of information, may undercut, may undercut COPA's ability to balance transparency with investigative needs and may also undercut the long-term goal of public trust. It doesn't say it will. It says it might.

And in the abstract, it is hard to quarrel with the use of may, you need to know in a particular situation what was what.

MS. RITTER: I would submit it is impossible honestly for anybody to say something that will happen, a certainty of something that will happen in the future.

In other words, releasing this video will cause a witness to change his testimony once he sees the video.

I mean no one can predict the future, but I think in this case the word "may" is used in a fashion, especially as through the affidavit that we submitted, to say this is a serious danger that's based on her experience

as administrator and based on fact and --

THE COURT: She just assume not have somebody else managing the narrative anyway.

Narrative driven as she is using it is not a complimentary term.

MS. RITTER: Correct.

THE COURT: But whenever we treat her as operating in an atmosphere of may or might, we have a problem with the language of the FOIA exemption which doesn't say may or might, it says would.

MS. RITTER: I agree that it says would. I just don't know, from a practical perspective, when you are talking about, you know, if I were the administrator or someone with an investigatory background, in my professional opinion this is the sort of thing that might cause a witness -- I mean no one can predict whether a witness, even if he sees the video, might chose to comport his testimony to the video, or might chose to not do so or might inadvertently chose, you know, may absolutely

intend not to, but inadvertently do so, because of the failing of human memory.

I don't know that there is ever a situation someone can say it would do that, you can't get in the mind of a witness about something that hasn't occurred yet.

THE COURT: Well, that's a peculiarly legal analysis and it is a familiar one.

That's why we exclude witnesses in trial. It is not we are sure they are going to try to lie, it is we don't want to spend the time figuring out that they didn't.

The general assembly is mostly lawyers, it has got to be at least half lawyers, and they know the difference between would and might or should and might.

So I can't conclude that I should read to the extent that disclosure would interfere as meaning to the extent that disclosure might interfere.

That's -- I grant you the treatises on statutory construction. So you

can prove anything from the treatises on the statutes of statutory construction.

That does seem to be a bit of a stretch, doesn't it?

MS. RITTER: I understand your position. I just wonder, you know, in general as to how to interpret the statute, in any way that makes sense, because there is never a time that somebody can predict what will cause a witness to comport his testimony.

THE COURT: But that's a larger problem, to some extent it is the elephant in the room. And I may as well point out there is an elephant in the room.

There is nothing more interesting to the news media than a huge loud problem.

MS. RITTER: I'm sorry.

THE COURT: Than a huge loud problem.

There is also nothing that is likely to make a huge loud problem worse than disclosing it in big head lines before anybody has an opportunity to come to grips with it.

So if we were going to write a statute that was intended to maximize the ability of authorities to deal with difficult and really potentially problem causing problems, we probably wouldn't do it the way FOIA is written.

The thing is FOIA by its nature appears to have almost taken that whole dialogue off the table. That's what the general assembly chose to do.

And although it might make sense to go to Springfield and say: Look, people you might want to rethink this a bit. The way they wrote it is the way they wrote it, and we are stuck with it.

And the argument that Mr. Topic has, namely Superintendent Johnson chose to release part of this video, unless we assume that he doesn't know his job, which is not an assumption I'm willing to make, he came to the conclusion that that was okay.

All we want now is the rest of

it.

MS. RITTER: To be clear the rest of that video and additional other videos.

THE COURT: The rest of the videographic record leads to the facts.

MS. RITTER: Agreed.

THE COURT: But that doesn't change the point that I am making.

MS. RITTER: I understand.

THE COURT: Once you open the door and the horse has run out, it doesn't matter how good the lock on the door is, they are gone.

Is there -- within the confines of FOIA's language is there a response to that, do you think in this instance?

MS. RITTER: Only what I believe I've already made clear, I don't want to belabor it, that the administrator of COPA or any other, you know, sort of person who has seen the video is in the position to say look, while a certain segment of the video -- of the existing videos, plural, has been released, there are other

parts that we still have concerns.

The fact that one portion was released doesn't obviate the risk that there is other portions that if a witness saw could comport or would comport their testimony to it.

So I don't know that -- I think it is fair to say here that Chief Administrator Roberts, rather than just rolling over on it and saying I disagree with your decision to release that portion of the video, and shouldn't do it in the future, she made it very clear, both at the police board and in the letter to Superintendent Johnson.

And again in the affidavit, I'm talking about this case, you release that small portion of the video, there is other stuff in the rest of the video that is going -- that again, the word is may, may, you know, infuse the investigation that COPA is participating in.

She chose to take a stand on that issue, as opposed to just saying, don't do that

1 in the future.

THE COURT: I understand what you are saying, but I think you would have to focus more on her letter, which is a much more general policy pronouncement.

But on your transcription at pages 7 and 8 of your summary judgment motion of what Administrator Roberts said to the police board in the July 19th meeting, which has more to do with the particular situation.

MS. RITTER: Correct. And she says in that transcript, you know, for example, further audio and video release prior to the interview of key witnesses creates substantial risk to the entirety of this investigation.

THE COURT: Okay. I -- that's what I was looking at, that's a conclusory statement, you know that.

MS. RITTER: It is, but she -- I believe that she flushes it out with her example just above that that COPA must insure that witnesses, civilian or sworn, do not

intentionally or otherwise comport their interview statement to what they observed on video rather than their independent recollection. So she is flushing out that conclusion statement.

THE COURT: Couldn't you argue that the remedy for that, given the FOIA framework and given the circumstances that exist in this particular instance, is for COPA to get the heck on the job as fast as possible and get the interviews done.

MS. RITTER: In this case, the complaint was filed only 2 business days after the shooting at 11 in the morning, so really only --

THE COURT: Okay. But I'm not talking now about the filing of the complaint, I'm talking about where we are, we are now what a month after the police board's meeting of July 19th.

MS. RITTER: As I mentioned at the beginning of my argument, here they are

planning to release the materials today and they hustled as much as they can.

I can tell you from my personal experience being involved in this, and their process of releasing videos, in fact, you know, that's part of my duties, it does take time to gather the records.

For example, your Honor, in this case there is not only body work camera footage, in fact I've seen a lot of it, there are 80 separate body warrant camera videos, each of which are, you know, random in time from about 20 minutes to an hour.

Because after the shooting there was a lot of crowd reaction and a number of officers, you know, responding to that event.

And so we have a ton of body video.

On top of that, and so COPA has to watch all of that. On top of that there are third-party videos that were gathered from the stores that were on the street that the incident occurred on. So it does take --

THE COURT: You mean security cameras?

MS. RITTER: Security cameras,

correct.

THE COURT: Not some guy with an iPhone?

MS. RITTER: Correct. In this case, we don't have any, you know, guy with an iPhone video. In this case we have surveillance video.

You know, there are -- they have to talk to the witnesses and find out, is there a guy with an iPhone who has this? I mean that's part of their investigation.

So it does take time to gather the records together in order for them to find out who the witnesses are to be interviewed.

That can happen, you know, it certainly can't happen in two business days.

And arguably it is a very very onerous process for it to happen in 30 days, which luckily it has happened here.

I suppose a little more than

30 days, 6 weeks or so.

though, accepting the practical truth of everything you are saying, that it is improbable that this will be the last time when COPA or the department gets caught flat footed by an early release of something, and it would probably be a good idea to have in place, ahead of time, some protocols for how to deal with that.

So that not only do you prevent the barn door from being inappropriately opened, but also if it is opened, you have a procedure in place whereby you can stop even more horses from getting out.

MS. RITTER: Understood.

THE COURT: Rather than simply making conclusory statements about it, which doesn't help much of anybody, so but I understand that your situation in this is not terribly easy.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MS. RITTER: Your Honor, I think I

stated everything I need to say in this, I don't think I have a further argument other than, you know, just again to reiterate, I don't think it was a conclusory statement that superintendent -- Chief Administrator Roberts made about how the release of further video would impede the ongoing administrative proceeding.

She does make statements about, you know, based on her experience as a law enforcement officer, you know, that releasing the further parts of the video, the entire horse wasn't out of the barn by releasing the small portion or more horses.

And that those horses need to be kept in check until such time as it makes sense, you know, from a practical purpose, police and stuff, COPA exists.

There is obviously a strong
public interest in the existence of COPA to do
investigations and have integrity of their
investigations of potential police misconduct.

weapon COPA automatically investigates. What they have done here, particularly as someone, you know, unfortunately passed away in this incident, to inspect the other entities of the City, the police department to release everything within two days business days after the shooting or we are going to get sued the next day is absolutely not -- it doesn't follow -- I mean, first of all, it doesn't follow the written terms of FOIA as far as the time limit.

But even if it did, it doesn't serve the public interest in allowing COPA to do its independent investigation of the police department.

THE COURT: Although, this would not be the first occasion on which two equally valid public interests happened to have collided head on in a particular situation, it is going to happen.

MS. RITTER: Sure.

THE COURT: Mr. Topic.

MR. TOPIC: You know, I don't really have anything to say that you didn't address already.

I guess just briefly to the time and point, I do want to point out the suit was filed because the City, the police department publically stated it was not going to release anything further.

So it is not a situation in which every time there has been a shooting and two days later there necessarily will be a lawsuit, the City and the police department made that announcement in unequivocal terms.

And I would note here, then they even took an extension of five more business days. They had already made a decision --

THE COURT: If you were them would you have?

MR. TOPIC: If I was them, I would have released this video within 24 hours or 48 hours at least like other City's do, that's

1 what I would do.

If I had their goals and their motivations, then yes, I would make this take as long as possible.

You know, procedurally, I think,
I don't even know that we need to get into
this, I think we can leave today with an agreed
order that COPA is going to produce it today
and CPD will refer our client to the place
online where he can download those videos.

So I don't necessarily know we need to get into that, it certainly should not be a problem for us to amend the complaint to add in what is already flushed out in the pleadings, because there is nothing in the additional events that occurred after we filed suit that anyway has changed the analysis here. They did exactly what they said they were going to do.

THE COURT: Well, you have tendered the possibility of resolving today's proceeding by way of an agreed order.

I can't agree for anybody, but it certainly makes sense to me.

And the Court would have a -would suggest a push in that direction in the
sense that one of the worst things that a Court
can do is to unnecessarily decide an issue the
Court doesn't actually have to decide,
especially where the issue is a difficult
issue.

So if the two of you want to get the Court off that hook, the Court is not going to object to your efforts.

MS. RITTER: I didn't want to interrupt you, your Honor, but yes, the City would agree to that agreed order.

THE COURT: Okay. Why don't we recess briefly then and see if the two of you can come up with the text of an order that makes you comfortable, that won't necessarily end this case, but it will certainly end the proceeding that we are involved in today and it gets me off the cafe hook.

```
1
               MR. TOPIC: Great. Thank you, your
 2
     Honor.
 3
                           Briefly in recess.
               THE COURT:
 4
                       (Recess.)
 5
               THE COURT: Do we have an order?
 6
               MS. RITTER:
                            We do.
 7
               MR. TOPIC: We do. Could we have a
 8
     date for further status?
 9
               THE COURT: What makes sense?
10
               MR. TOPIC: Around a week.
11
               THE COURT:
                            Okay.
12
               MR. TOPIC: Longer is not a problem.
13
               THE COURT:
                            The keeper of the book is
14
     looking skeptical.
15
               THE CLERK:
                           Next Thursday at 2:00.
16
               MR. TOPIC: I have a doctor's
17
     appointment, if we need to go to the week
18
     after, that wouldn't be a problem.
19
               THE CLERK: Tuesday the 4th.
20
     Otherwise we could do Friday, Friday the 7th.
21
               MS. RITTER: I'm fine with the 4th. If
22
     counsel --
```

1	MR. TOPIC: What time?
2	THE CLERK: 10:00.
3	MR. TOPIC: That would be fine, the
4	4th at 10:00.
5	THE COURT: Put that in the order and
6	sign the order. Thank you both.
7	MR. TOPIC: And, your Honor, we just
8	wanted to thank you again, I know we expedited
9	this and I know that
10	THE COURT: There is that thing in the
11	statute.
12	MR. TOPIC: We try to use that
13	sparingly, but we do appreciate you getting it
14	done.
15	(WHICH were all of the
16	proceedings had in the above
17	entitled cause.)
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	

1 STATE OF ILLINOIS) 2 3 COUNTY OF COOK) SS: 4 Re: WILLIAM CALLOWAY V. CPD No. 18 CH 8965 5 6 I, Carol M. Siebert-LaMonica, C.S.R. in 7 for the County of Cook, State of Illinois, do hereby certify that the foregoing Report of 8 9 Proceedings was recorded stenographically by me 10 and was reduced to computerized transcript 11 under my direction, and that the said 12 transcript constitutes a true record of the 13 proceedings. 14 I further certify that I am not a relative 15 or employee or attorney or counsel of any of 16 the parties, or relative or employee of such 17 attorney or counsel, or financially interested 18 directly or indirectly in this action. 19 I affixed my signature this 20th day of 20 August, A.D. 2018.

21 Magase, 11.2

22

CAROL M., SIEBERT-LAMONICA, C.S.R.

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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS

CALLANAY V. CHICAGO POLICE DEPT	
v.	No. 18 CH 8965
CHICAGO POLICE DEPT	
AGREED ORDER	
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~	A 1 / / :
The Civilian Office of Police	Accountability
shall produce all of the 1	equestes lecords
at issue in this case by	
August 16, 2018. Case is	set for
August 16, 2018. Case is further status on Sept. 4	2018 N 100 am.
Atty. No.: 41295	
Name: Matt Tapic ENTE	CRED:
Atty. for: Plantfl	JUDGE PETER FLYNN-1784
Address: 311 N Aberden Dated	AUG 16 2018
City/State/Zip: 606 07	DOROTHY BROWN CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, IL DEPUTY CLERK
Telephone: 312-243-548	Judge's No.

DOROTHY BROWN, CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS

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IN THE	CIRCUIT COURT, COOK	COUNTY	ILLING	DIS	
	CHANCERY DIVI	SION			
WILLIAM	CALLOWAY,)		
	Plaintiff,)		
vs.) No.	18 CH	08965
CHICAGO	POLICE DEPARTMENT,)		
	Defendant.)		

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS at the hearing of the above-entitled cause before the Honorable

JUDGE PETER FLYNN, Judge of said Court, in

Courtroom 2408, Daley Center, Chicago, Illinois

on Friday, September 7, 2018 commencing at

10:15 A.M.

		2
1	APPEARANCES:	
2	LOEVY & LOEVY, by	
3	MR. JOSH BURDAY	
4	(311 North Aderdeen, 3rd Floor	
5	Chicago, Illinois 60607)	
6	appeared on behalf of the plaintiff;	
7		
8	CITY OF CHICAGO, by	
9	MS. AMBER RITTER	
10	MS. MARTHA VICTORIA DIAZ	
11	(30 North LaSalle Street, Suite 1720	
12	Chicago, Illinois 60602)	
13	appeared on behalf of the defendant.	
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22		

MS. RITTER: Amber Ritter and Martha

Diaz for the City Police Department.

MR. BURDAY: Good morning, your Honor.

Josh Burday on behalf of plaintiff.

So the issues of penalties and attorneys fees remain.

We also need something in writing demonstrating that all of the records have been produced.

We fully expect that all of the records have been produced, we just need something in writing confirming that and we just --

THE COURT: Pursuant to what?

MR. BURDAY: Well, I mean we could,

16 you know, come in on motion practice, you know.

THE COURT: Pursuant to what?

If we were talking a Rule 214 document production request, you would be entitled to something in writing that says the records have been produced.

I don't know of a section of the

Freedom of Information Act that calls for the same procedure as it applies under Rule 214.

And I'm reluctant to invent yet another requirement to FOIA, which already has plenty.

So I see why you would like to have some kind of certification of completeness.

But the first question is what exactly does it say.

And the second question is, what is the authority for my requiring it as opposed to the three of you agreeing on some language?

MR. BURDAY: So as a practical matter, it wouldn't need to be an affidavit from our prospective, anything in writing would be fine.

The authority for it would be the requirement to prove that you performed an adequate search, and that is a requirement under FOIA.

THE COURT: So every response to a FOIA request has to include detailed analysis

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1
     of what search was done?
 2
               MR. BURDAY: It could potentially,
 3
     yes.
 4
               THE COURT: But could potentially and
 5
     required in every case aren't the same things.
 6
               MR. BURDAY:
                           Right. Well, a lot of
 7
     times, you know, a requestor requests a record
 8
     and the record is turned over.
 9
               THE COURT:
                           That's kind of what I
10
     thought you had here.
11
               MR. BURDAY: And we expect that we do
12
     have everything here.
                           We are not expecting,
13
     you know, we weren't anticipating any motion
14
     practice on the issue, we just wanted
     confirmation.
15
16
               THE COURT: I entered an order on
17
     August 16th, which was an agreed order.
18
                   On -- the language of the order
19
     came from Mr. Topic himself.
20
               MR. BURDAY:
                            Yes, your Honor.
21
               THE COURT: And it said:
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"The Civilian Office of Police

Accountability produce all of the requested records at issue in this case by 5:00 P.M. on August 16th."

There does not presently appear to be a dispute about whether that was done.

Why isn't the order and the fact that it was entered by agreement, an adequate demonstration that the records that were produced were the records that you were looking for?

If there is something specific that you think you should have, but you don't have, that's a whole other thing, and we can talk about that.

If all you want is general satisfaction, you have got that in the language of the order itself I would think.

MR. BURDAY: So what we were looking for is something from CPD saying that what COPA produced was everything that CPD had. And CPD didn't have something more that wasn't produced by COPA.

MS. RITTER: Again, your Honor's order, which was an agreed order, orders that very thing. And we are, you know, here to say that we complied with the order.

I agree with your Honor's point that to have an affidavit in every FOIA request or every case that's complete is beyond the scope of what FOIA requires.

As your Honor noted, there is an order saying you must produce everything that's requested by 5:00 P.M., which we have done.

THE COURT: It may well be,

Mr. Burday, that literally speaking the police

department has some piece of paper that wasn't

requested.

Since the agreement was to produce all of the records that were requested, the existence of some other piece paper would seem to me to be beside the point, particularly when I'm looking at an agreed order, and no apparent dispute about whether the order was complied with.

Before I require some kind of sweeping certification, I want to know why. And a reason doesn't hit me at the moment.

Again, this is different from a situation where you look at a bunch of documents and you say, these documents ought to include X Y and Z. But that's not the issue here. As far as we know, X Y and Z were included. So I would think we are done in terms of production.

MR. BURDAY: Well, certainly if counsel is willing to represent that, and I would just say that anything outside of the scope of the request, we had just been treating as though, you know, we didn't expect anything outside of the scope of the request.

THE COURT: That's what the order said.

MR. BURDAY: Right. Certainly if there was other records outside of the scope of the request, that would not -- we would not expect that to be produced. We would not

expect that to be anything in writing saying it had been produced.

It was just the records that -- within the scope of the request CPD had, if they had not been produced by COPA.

And if counsel is willing, you know, to say on the record that everything that CPD had was produced by COPA then that would be --

THE COURT: I would not ask counsel to say that on the record, because that would go beyond the scope of the August 14th order anyway.

What I would expect counsel to say on the record as officers of the Court, is that the agreed order has been complied with.

And I think they did say that.

So I think you got what you came for in that sense.

MR. BURDAY: Okay.

THE COURT: Now, your position is that there are issues of further relief.

MR. BURDAY: Yes, the issues of penalties and fees.

THE COURT: Okay. Have you discussed that at all?

MS. RITTER: We haven't.

Your Honor, I want to remind the Court that we actually don't have any kind of finding against us. We had an agreed order to produce the records that day, which was complied with.

THE COURT: Ms. Ritter, the difficulty here is that as you know, FOIA plaintiffs as a group take the position that there is always a fee no matter what.

The language of FOIA is not exactly crystal clear.

MS. RITTER: But I would submit that -- I'm sorry.

THE COURT: I think we are going to have to litigate this out to the extent that the parties can't agree on it, because there is no instantly self-evident solution to that

1 problem.

And one can read FOIA as saying that -- I'm not saying that I think one ought to, but one can read FOIA as saying that any time there is a FOIA request and there is anything more than instant full compliance, fees are proved.

The body of case law on this is sparse and really not helpful.

If we have to develop the case law, we may be doing future generations a favor, painful as to all of us at the present time.

So I can't just sort of wave a magic wand that way and suddenly make it clear.

MS. RITTER: We are happy to brief the issue should plaintiff here file a fee petition, which he hasn't done.

We do think that the case law, while I agree its sparse and not necessarily always illustrative, it does say -- the prevailing case law does says that a plaintiff

prevails and is entitled to receive -- when he received records as a result of the lawsuit.

Our position would be that we made it clear at the beginning of the hearing when we were back here on the 16th, that we were prepared to produce those records that day anyway, and they would be produced anyway pursuant to the COPA video release policy.

So our position is that they did not get these records as a result of this lawsuit. Again that's something we are happy to brief.

THE COURT: There is room for them to argue that they did get the records as a result of the lawsuit.

While the argument much of the time is from my prospective profitless because the cost of answering the question dwarfs the amount in dispute anyway.

The same problem exists there as exists in the 1983 -- or 1988 situation where a Court has to decide whether a governmental body

changed its policy as a result of the lawsuit or just because it was going to anyhow.

The problem is I believe more acute in the FOIA situation, because the FOIA version of that problem will occur and be replicated time after time after time.

And we really ought to have some fairly clear guidelines as to how to proceed.

Somebody has to set the guidelines. I would rather it wasn't me, but if we have to start somewhere then we have to start somewhere.

I think you are quite right though, that from the standpoint of resolving the issue here it is going to have to start with a fee petition.

And you are going to have to articulate in connection with your fee petition why you consider yourselves to be the prevailing parties.

Then the City can take issue with that, and we will try to sort it out.

MR. BURDAY: Yes, your Honor. Taking a step back, I can tell you our client's concern here is that this is something we are going to see to continue to replicate in the future.

We are very happy that the video was released in a much more timely manner this time, but it is a recurring theme, that CPD continues to rely on COPA, COPA's investigation, to deny the records, but that's not what the law says.

They make claims about release interfering with the investigations that they don't prove out.

And there is a concern that this is going to keep happening moving forward.

I mean we would be happy to sit down with your Honor and have a settlement conference and just talk about trying to work something out.

THE COURT: The only form of working something out that would be worth having a

settlement conference about that involves the Court is trying to come up with a set of guidelines that could be applied to each case anybody can envision and would yield an answer straightaway. That is worth trying to work out.

I don't know that this is the precise case in which to try to do that, but that is certainly something that would be helpful to work out.

The difficulty that you have structurally here, in my view, is that you don't have to be particularly devious to envisage a use of FOIA which is intended to impair an ongoing investigation. We don't want that to happen.

If it is possible to come up with a bright-line rule, and you want it to be bright line so that we don't have to replicate it every time.

MR. BURDAY: Right.

THE COURT: That serves your purpose

of encouraging prompt release at the same time as it prevents misuse of FOIA to derail an ongoing investigation then yeah, that is well worth talking about.

At the moment though I don't have any sort of a record on which to address that question.

And as I said I think it is going to have to begin with a fee petition from your side.

MR. BURDAY: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: If the three of you can work out, I can't believe I'm doing this to myself, if the three of you can work out a formula for a test case that actually works, okay, let's do it, and we will see what happens.

MS. RITTER: That is something to consider. I appreciate the Court's guidance on that. We will talk to our client and see if that's something that what we can do.

I think that would not be a bad

idea at all, if that's possible.

THE COURT: Okay. I just want to flag the Court also that we just last night received a discovery request from plaintiff.

I believe what he is saying goes to whether there should be a penalty for willful violation of FOIA in this case, they include subpoenas to COPA and to, I guess, the mayor's office, subpoena for depositions, requests for production that includes -- or request for all documents discussing the decision in the Laquan McDonald shooting case. I mean they are quite broad.

As I mentioned to the Court, we just got these last night. We will probably move to at least limit or strike some of them.

THE COURT: The first thing you are going go to need to do is go through a 201 (k) conference.

MS. RITTER: Correct.

THE COURT: Off of the top of my head, although the discovery requests would not be

particularly germane to the production of documents that have already been produced, they might have a bearing on the fee petition, which is going to come because they might address some of the issues we have just been talking about in that regard.

What I think you might want to do is first try to figure out what the parameters of that discussion are likely to be, and then look at these discovery requests in light of those parameters.

But that's in the first instance for the three of you to do, not for me to do. So --

MS. RITTER: I agree. I think to me it seems that the best first step would be that they file their fee petition. That we see what issues are at issue there. And then we discuss you know, the discovery, if necessary going forward.

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. RITTER: And then also respond to

the motion for fee petition.

MR. BURDAY: Well we need to go through the discovery before filing anything related to the discovery.

THE COURT: No. I am not going -- this is a variance on a proposition that there is more support in the case law for it than I would have thought.

According to the Appellate Court, and therefore according to me, a Court has no authority to issue discovery or to permit the issuance of discovery without a proper complaint on file.

Here if you were issuing discovery solely in aid of getting the documents that you've already got, I would strike it because it is redundant and pointless.

We all agree that to the extent that the discovery is significant, it has a bearing on a fee petition which doesn't yet exist.

And I just made the point that if you are going to have a meaningful 201 (k) conference, which you need to do before I start considering whether to compel discovery, you have to have it not in the abstract but in the context of particular issues. That's the fee petition that hasn't been filed yet.

In this instance the logic of saying that you can't have discovery if there is no valid complaint on file, translates perfectly into you can't have this kind of discovery if there is no fee petition on file. We've got to do things one step at a time.

MR. BURDAY: I understand exactly what your Honor is saying. We have spoken or corresponded with counsel and their position is that all of the City departments do their best to complete investigations and release the records as soon as possible. And that's the factual issue that we dispute or one of the factual issues.

THE COURT: I don't care what all City

departments do, the only thing I would care about in this case, is who had had the records that were produced to you and should they have been produced sooner.

And that's definitely not all

City departments. I certainly hope it isn't all

City departments about there are what, several

hundred?

MS. RITTER: There is.

THE COURT: I will set this for status in say 30 days. Talk to each other in the meantime.

To the extent that you can come back with a roadmap for kind of a little mini-test case, great. If you can't, we will just see what hands everybody has and play them as they exist. What's the date?

THE CLERK: October 10th.

MS. RITTER: Yes.

THE COURT: October 10th at 9:30.

MS. RITTER: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. BURDAY: Thanks, your Honor.

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1
      STATE OF ILLINOIS )
 2
 3
     COUNTY OF COOK
                         )
                            SS:
 4
          Re:
               WILLIAM CALLOWAY V. CPD
 5
               No. 18 CH 8965
 6
          I, Carol M. Siebert-LaMonica, C.S.R. in
 7
     for the County of Cook, State of Illinois, do
     hereby certify that the foregoing Report of
 8
 9
     Proceedings was recorded stenographically by me
10
     and was reduced to computerized transcript
11
     under my direction, and that the said
12
     transcript constitutes a true record of the
13
     proceedings.
14
          I further certify that I am not a relative
15
     or employee or attorney or counsel of any of
16
     the parties, or relative or employee of such
17
     attorney or counsel, or financially interested
18
     directly or indirectly in this action.
19
          I affixed my signature this 7th day of
     September, A.D. 2018
20
                    CAROL M. SIEBERT-LAMONICA, C.S.R.
21
22
                     Illinois CSR License 084.0001355
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AGG. ASSULT - P. O.	asa/ 2042	E 7/5	2 CORRECTED 3: BEAT O	3 /
5. VICTIM'S SUBJECT'S NAME AS SHOWN ON LAST PREVIOUS REPORT		□1 YES 2 NO	6 FIRE RELATED 7 BEAT A	2//
3510 S. MICHIGAN	9, TYPE OF LOCATION OR PREMISE WHERE	INCIDENT/OFFENSE OCCURRED	LOCA	304
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11. OFFENDER'S NAME (OR DESCRIBE CLOTHING, ETC.)	12. HOME ADDRESS	CODE HEIG	HT WEIGHT EYES HAIF	R COMPL.
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16, OFF'S, VEHICLE YEAR MAKE BODY STYLE COLOR	V.I.N.		STATE LICENSE NO.	STATE
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93, REPORTING OFFICER (PRINT NAME) STAR NO. 94, REPORTI	NG OFFICER (PRINT NAME) STAR NO.	SIGNATURE		49.70
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